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Connecticut v. Johnson:
Can Sandstrom Error Ever Be Harmless?
INTRODUCTION
A presumption is an evidentiary device which enables the trier
of fact to assume the existence of one fact upon proof of an-
other.1 The use of a presumption as a method of proof in a crim-
inal trial may in some cases violate the accused's constitutional
rights. This potential is particularly dangerous where the pre-
sumption enables the jury to conclude without proof the exist-
ence of an essential element of a crime which the prosecution is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.2 In Sandstrom v.
Montana,3 the United States Supreme Court examined a trial
court's instruction to a jury that "the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."' 4 The
1. "Generally speaking, presumptions involve a relationship between one fact or set of
facts-the basic fact(s)-and another fact or set of facts-the presumed fact(s). Basic
facts imply presumed facts, the strength of the implication varying with the [nature of
the] presumption. Where a presumption exists, certain advantages usually accrue to a
party proving the basic fact which would not accrue absent the presumption." R. LEM-
PERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 803 (2d ed. 1982).
The nature of presumptions vary, depending on their wording. Some "presumptions"
allow, but do not require, the trier of fact to infer the existence of the presumed fact upon
sufficient proof of the basic fact. Such a "presumption" is really not a presumption at all,
but, rather, a permissive inference. Other presumptions, referred to as rebuttable pre-
sumptions, require the trier of fact to find the existence of the presumed fact upon proof of
the basic fact, unless the adverse party can prove the presumed fact false. Conclusive
presumptions mandate that the trier of fact conclusively find the existence of the pre-
sumed fact upon proof of the basic fact. Id. at 803-20.
Presumptions are created both by courts and by statute. Often their aim is to produce
socially desirable results in certain situations where, although there is a lack of compe-
tent evidence to prove so, it is common knowledge that one fact would likely have fol-
lowed from another. For example, in some jurisdictions the mailing of a properly stamped
and addressed letter raises a presumption that the letter was received by the addressee; in
some jurisdictions, the birth of a child to a married woman separated from her husband
raises a presumption that the husband was nevertheless the father of the child. The
extent to which the trier of fact is required to find the existence of these presumed facts,
and the extent to which the adverse party may be required or even allowed to disprove
them, depends on the nature of the presumption. Id. See also infra note 33.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 31-40.
3. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
4. Id. at 512.
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Court concluded that the instruction violated the defendant's
right to due process of law. In so holding, the Court found that
the jury could reasonably have interpreted the instruction as
describing a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption, either of
which would have obviated the requirement that the prosecution
prove the element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt.5
Well before Sandstrom was decided, the Supreme Court in
Chapman v. California6 held that some constitutional errors
may be so insignificant in the setting of a particular case that
they may be deemed harmless.7 The Court enunciated a test
which allows reviewing courts to uphold convictions if, in light
of all the evidence presented at trial, it appears beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
jury's verdict.8
In Connecticut v. Johnson,9 the Supreme Court addressed the
question left unanswered by its decision in Sandstrom: whether
a Sandstrom error, i.e., a trial court instruction which removes
the determination of an essential element of a crime from the
jury, can ever be so insignificant as to be harmless under the
holding of Chapman. The result was an equally divided Court.
Four members of the Court concluded that a Sandstrom error
could never be harmless because it is impossible to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt the effect that such an error may
5. Id. at 523-24.
6. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 24. See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (use at trial of confes-
sion which may have been recorded in violation of accused's sixth amendment right to
counsel would nevertheless have been harmless where jurors were presented with other
overwhelming evidence of guilt); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (violation of
accused's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him was harmless where
accused's own unchallenged confession was minutely detailed and completely consistent
with other objective and persuasive evidence of guilt); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970) (unnecessary to decide whether evidence was admitted in violation of accused's
fourth amendment rights where other evidence in record clearly showed that error would
have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969)
(denial of accused's sixth amendment right to have counsel present at preliminary hear-
ing required that conviction be vacated and remanded for determination of whether error
was harmless in light of other evidence); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)
(violation of accused's sixth amendment right to confront adverse witnesses was harm-
less where evidence of guilt was overwhelming); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967) (other evidence of accused's guilt not persuasive enough to preclude reasonable
possibility that damaging prosecutorial comment on accused's failure to testify might
reasonably have contributed to jury's verdict).
9. 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983).
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have had on a jury's verdict. Four other justices reached the
opposite conclusion, stating that a Sandstrom error may be
harmless in certain situations where it is clear beyond a reason-
able doubt that the erroneous instruction did not contribute to
the jury's verdict. The remaining justice declined to consider the
question. The division within the Court concerning the question
has thus failed to resolve the conflict that has developed within
the federal circuits concerning this issue. 10
This note will first examine the development of the harmless
error doctrine under Chapman and its subsequent refinement
under Sandstrom. It will then analyze the Johnson Court's di-
vergent viewpoints on the applicability of the harmless error
doctrine to a Sandstrom error to determine whether such an
error can ever be harmless. To guide this analysis, this note will
focus on the process by which a Sandstrom error is determined
and the implications arising from that process.
BACKGROUND
Chapman v. California: The Harmless Error Doctrine
In the early nineteenth century, English courts created what
became known as the "Exchequer Rule." This doctrine man-
dated reversal for any error committed during the course of a
trial, no matter how slight or insignificant.11 Later, when Amer-
ican courts adopted the rule, the result was a tremendous back-
log of cases from overturned convictions. 2 Although the Eng-
lish legislature subsequently created a harmless error rule which
10. The Eleventh Circuit has held that Sandstrom errors can be harmless if the evi-
dence of guilt is overwhelming. Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1982).
Several other circuits have taken the position that whether or not a Sandstrom error can
be harmless depends on whether intent was a disputed issue in the case. United States v.
Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1144-45 (1st Cir. 1981); Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 453-54
(2d Cir. 1981); Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131 (8th Cir. 1981); McGuinn v. Crist, 657 F.2d
1107, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit has held that Sandstrom error can never
be harmless because of the possibility that the error might have contributed to the jury's
verdict. Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1979).
11. See Crease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (1835).
12. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940), wherein the author notes that the
Exchequer Rule "did more than any other one rule of law to increase the delay and
expense of litigation, to encourage defiant criminality and oppression, and to foster the
spirit of litigious gambling." Id. Another commentator noted that the excessive number
of reversals that resulted from the application of the Exchequer Rule had transformed the
courts into "impregnable citadels of technicality." Kavanaugh, Improvement of Adminis-
tration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925).
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prohibited reversal absent substantial wrong, 13 American courts
continued to reverse any convictions based on error. This strict
approach led some lawyers to intentionally inject error into trials
as a hedge against losing verdicts.' 4
In an effort to combat the problems created by the application
of the strict Exchequer Rule, statutes were enacted during the
first half of the twentieth century at the state and federal levels
to eliminate reversals based solely upon technical errors not
affecting substantial rights. 15 Neither the federal nor state sta-
tutes, however, applied to federal constitutional errors, 16 and
despite increasing criticism,17 the United States Supreme Court
continued to reverse convictions based on federal constitutional
error, no matter how slight.
Finally, in the 1967 case of Chapman v. California,18 the
Supreme Court formulated a harmless error rule by which fed-
eral constitutional errors could be analyzed for harmlessness.
The Court held that although some constitutional rights are "so
basic to a fair trial that their infractions can never be treated as
harmless error,"'19 some constitutional errors are so insignificant
that they may be deemed harmless, not requiring the reversal of
13. 1875, Judicature Act, 1883, Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 39, rule 6.
14. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 190 n.35 (1939).
15. By 1967, all 50 states had enacted harmless error statutes. See Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The harmless error statute first enacted by Congress in
1919, Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982), has
remained essentially unchanged, and reads: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."
16. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Chapman, noted that the language of the
various harmless error statutes invariably addressed only "technical" errors, errors
which "did not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 386 U.S. at 22. State statutes
had uniformly avoided any reference to federal constitutional errors. Id. One commenta-
tor has suggested that this was due to the fact that the Supreme Court, prior to Chap-
man, had never seriously considered the question of whether a federal constitutional
error could be harmless, and thus the state legislatures had never envisioned that such
an error could be harmless either. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421,423-25 (1980).
17. See supra note 12. The organized bar formed the Special Committee to Suggest
Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Lit-
igation. Pound, Taft, Wigmore, Hadley, and Frankfurter were among those members of
the legal community involved in the coalition. Goldberg, supra note 16, at 422 n.15.
18. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
19. Id. at 23 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). See also Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Justice Black, the
author of the Chapman opinion, gave no explanation as to why the three types of errors
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the conviction.20 Before an error can be deemed harmless, how-
ever, a reviewing court must be able to conclude beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury's
verdict. 21
In fashioning a federal harmless error rule, the Court noted
that such a rule could serve a very useful purpose by blocking
the reversal of convictions for "small errors or defects that have
little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of trial."22
The Court also noted, however, that a harmless error rule can
work "very unfair and mischievous results when, for example,
highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, though
legally forbidden, finds its way into trial in which the question of
guilt is a close one." 23 To strike the proper balance between these
competing concerns, the Court adopted a strict standard of rea-
sonable doubt.
Since Chapman, the Supreme Court has applied the harmless
error doctrine to a variety of federal constitutional errors, exam-
ining each error in light of the evidence presented at trial to
determine whether the error might reasonably have contributed
to the jury's verdict.24 The Court's continued application of the
doctrine following Chapman has led to substantial use of the
doctrine by both federal and state courts. 25 This trend also has
represented by these cases (failure to provide trial counsel, coerced confessions, and lack
of an impartial judge, respectively) could never be harmless. No Supreme Court decision
until Johnson attempted to include a fourth type of constitutional error within this cate-
gory of errors.
20. 386 U.S. at 22.
21. Id. at 24. In Chapman, the prosecutor commented extensively on the defendants'
failure to testify on their own behalf. After the Chapmans' trial, but before their appeal,
the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that such comment
violated the defendant's fifth amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself. The Chapman Court concluded that the prosecutor's comments were not
harmless in light of the particular facts of the case. 386 U.S. at 24-26.
22. 386 U.S. at 22.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 8.
25. SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS lists over 6,000 citations to Chapman. One
commentator has estimated that 2.5% of all criminal appeals in the federal system each
year are harmless error cases. See Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal
Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 544-48 (1978). Another commentator has estimated that
the figure approaches 10% when state appellate court decisions are included. See Gold-
berg, supra note 16, at 421 n.3.
The substantial use of the doctrine by both federal and state courts has prompted sev-
eral commentators to suggest that the scope of the doctrine needs to be refined to insulate
violations of certain classes of important constitutional rights from harmlessness review.
1984]
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served as a reaffirmation of both the need for and the appropri-
ateness of a harmless error doctrine for federal constitutional
errors.
The Nature of Sandstrom Error
The United States Constitution guarantees certain protections
to the accused in a criminal trial. First, the sixth amendment
guarantees the right of the accused to have the question of his
guilt decided by a jury.26 Second, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment affords the accused in a criminal trial a
strong presumption of innocence, requiring proof of the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 27 The burden of such proof is
on the prosecution. 28
See, e.g., Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process
in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1976-77); Mause, Harmless Constitutional
Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1969); Saltz-
burg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973); Note, Harmful Use of
Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 544-48 (1978). Two compre-
hensive discussions on the impact and constitutional implications of the Chapman fed-
eral harmless error doctrine are R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 4-12 (1970),
and Goldberg, supra note 16.
26. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury... and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend VI. The purpose of a jury is to serve as a check on oppressive
government. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (a
jury's overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused and a potentially arbi-
trary or abusive government that is in command of the criminal sanction); Sparf &
Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895) ("The main reason ordinarily assigned
for a recognition of the right of a jury in a criminal case, to take the law into their own
hands, and to disregard the directions of the court in matters of law, is that the safety
and liberty of the citizen will thereby be more certainly secured.").
The sixth amendment thus prohibits a judge from directing a verdict against the
accused by removing the issue of guilt from the jury. See United States v. Martin Linen
Supply, 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (trial judge prohibited from entering a judgment of
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict); Carpenters & Join-
ers v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947) (judge may not direct a verdict of guilty in
criminal case no matter how conclusive the evidence); Sparf & Hansen v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895) (same).
27. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
28. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 215 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699-700 (1975); In Re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Facts essential to the crime charged differ from affirmative defenses;
states may constitutionally assign the burden of proving the existence of an affirmative
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A presumption is an evidentiary device which enables the trier
of fact to assume the existence of one fact upon proof of an-
other.29 The use of a presumption may violate the accused's con-
stitutional rights. It may, as a matter of law, instruct the jury to
presume without proof the existence of a fact essential to the
crime charged which the sixth amendment requires the jury to
determine of its own volition and which due process requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.30
In Sandstrom v. Montana,31 the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a trial court's instruction to a jury which
stated that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts."32 The Court reasoned that
the constitutionality of the instruction depended upon the nature
of the presumption which the jury could have inferred from the
instruction. 33 First, the jury could have interpreted the presump-
defense to the defendant. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
29. See supra note 1.
30. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (trial court's instructions to jury to
presume intent based on ordinary and necessary consequences of defendant's acts
invaded fact finding function of jury and conflicted with overriding presumption of inno-
cence afforded to accused); United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978)
(in action for alleged conspiracy to fix prices, instruction to jury to presume requisite
intent to fix prices so long as defendant's conduct actually had effect of fixing prices
invaded fact finding function by impermissibly removing issue from jury's considera-
tion); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (instruction which told jury to pre-
sume intent to steal where defendant took property without permission knowing it to
belong to another, despite defendant's argument that he thought property was aban-
doned, impermissably withdrew issue of fact from jury and conflicted with overriding
presumption of innocence afforded to accused).
31. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
32. Id. at 512. Sandstrom was tried on the charge of deliberate homicide, which
required that the killing have been committed with intent. Sandstrom contended at trial
that due to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption, he was unable to
form the requisite intent to kill.
33. -Id. at 514. Presumptions, which permit the jury to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts, and do not require the jury to find the existence of the presumed fact or
require the accused to disprove it, are constitutionally permissible. See Ulster County
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 160-62 (1979) (presumption constitutional where it gave rise
to a permissive inference available only in certain circumstances; presumption did not
create a mandatory conclusion, and could have been ignored by the jury even if there was
no affirmative proof offered by the defendant in rebuttal); Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S. 837 (1973) (presumption constitutional where trial court instructed jury that ordinar-
ily they would be justified in inferring from unexplained possession of recently stolen
mail that defendant possessed mail with knowledge that it was stolen); United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (instruction authorizing jury to infer from accused's unex-
plained presence at an illegal still that accused was carrying on business of illegal
distiller).
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tion as a "conclusive" presumption, an irrebuttable direction by
the court to the jury to find intent upon proof of the defendants'
voluntary actions and their ordinary consequences. 34 Second,
the jury might have interpreted the presumption as a "rebut-
table" presumption, a direction by the court to find intent upon
proof of the defendant's voluntary actions and their consequences
unless the defendant proved otherwise. 35
The Court noted that the common definition of "presume" is
"to suppose to be true without proof."36 Because of the lack of
any qualifying instructions from the trial judge as to the legal
effect of the presumption, the Court found that it could not dis-
count the possibility that the jury might reasonably have inter-
preted the instruction as describing either a conclusive or a
rebuttable presumption.37 The Court further stated that the other
general instructions given at trial38 did not remove or mitigate
the potential harm caused by the instruction on intent.39 The
Court concluded that because the jury might reasonably have
interpreted the instruction as describing either a conclusive or a
burden-shifting presumption, and because neither interpretation
forced the state to prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, the instruction had deprived the defendant of
his constitutional right to due process of law.40
The Sandstrom Court declined to address the question of
whether such an error could ever be a harmless one. 41 The Court
addressed the question three years later, however, in Connecticut
v. Johnson,42 attempting to resolve a conflict which had devel-
A comprehensive discussion of a series of United States Supreme Court decisions
which have examined the constitutionality of presumptions in a variety of different crim-
inal trial contexts is presented in Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal
Cases; A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARv. L. REV. 321
(1980).
34. 442 U.S. at 517. The Court noted that such an interpretation would prevent the
jury from reviewing evidence of intent. Id.
35. Id. at 517. The interpretation would effectively have shifted the prosecution's
burden of proof on the issue of intent to the defendant. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The other general instructions were that the accused was presumed innocent and
that the state had the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 518 n.7.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 523-24.
41. Id. at 526-27. The case was remanded to the Montana Supreme Court for a deter-
mination of whether the error was harmless. On remand, the Montana Supreme Court
held that it was not. 603 P.2d 244 (1979).
42. 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983).
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oped within the federal circuits during the interim.4 3
CONNECTICUT v. JOHNSON
Facts
The defendant, Lindsay Johnson, was tried before a jury on
charges of attempted murder, kidnapping, robbery, and sexual
assault for his role in the overnight abduction and sexual assault
of a woman. The evidence at trial revealed that Johnson and
three male companions were parked in an automobile when the
victim stopped her car and asked for directions. 44 Johnson
offered to accompany her in her car to show her the way. After a
short drive, Johnson forced her to stop the car and admit his
three companions and, subsequently, a fifth man.45 The victim
was then taken to an apartment, where all five men sexually
assaulted her.46 Johnson then bound the victim's hands with
telephone cord, threw her over a bridge into icy water, and drove
off in her car. The woman survived, and later provided informa-
tion which led to Johnson's arrest. Johnson was charged with
kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, and attempted murder.47
At trial, Johnson asserted that the woman had consented to
accompany him and to have sex with him, that he had not
intended to kill her, and that he had intended to return the
car.48 The jury returned a verdict of guilty an all four counts.
Johnson appealed his conviction to the Connecticut Supreme
Court, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated when
the trial court instructed the jury that "every person is conclu-
sively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences
of his act."49
The Connecticut Supreme Court
After examining the challenged instruction in light of the trial
court's charge to the jury on all four counts, the Connecticut
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on the kidnapping and
43. See supra note 10.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 971-72.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 973-75.
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sexual assaults counts, but reversed the convictions on the murder
and robbery counts.50 In analyzing the challenged instruction,
the court began by stating that the trial court's use of the word
"presume" in its instruction did not necessarily render the
instruction invalid under Sandstrom. The court instead found
that the lack of any further qualifying instructions as to the
legal effect of the statement had opened the door to the possibil-
ity that the jury might have interpreted the presumption as
either conclusive or burden-shifting. In either case, such an
instruction would be unconstitutional. 51 The court stated that a
presumptive instruction can be cured where it is accompanied by
other instructions that clearly delineate to the jury that the pre-
sumptive instruction actually authorizes only a permissible infer-
ence rather than a conclusive or burden-shifting presump-
tion.52 In assessing the effect of the challenged conclusive pre-
sumption instruction with respect to each count, the court noted
that there were additional instructions regarding intent to com-
mit kidnapping which explained to the jury that intent was large-
ly a matter of inference and that the inference was to be made
only after considering all of the circumstances.5 3 Upon conclud-
ing that these additional instructions had a significant curative
50. 185 Conn. 163, 168, 440 A.2d 858,861(1981).
51. Id.
52. Id. The court noted that the challenged instruction was given by the trial court
judge at the beginning of his charge to the jury before any instructions pertaining to the
specific counts in an attempt to explain to the jury principles applicable to criminal trials.
Id. at 169, 440 A.2d at 862. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury generally that:
first, the state bore the burden of proving all facts essential to the crime charged, includ-
ing intent, beyond a reasonable doubt; second, they were to be the sole judge of facts; and,
third, they could consider circumstantial evidence and draw inferences, but that all infer-
ences drawn had to be reasonable and logical, based upon established facts rather than
guess or surmise. Id. The court stated that had the challenged instruction contained only
the ambiguous word "presume," as was the case in Sandstrom, rather than the less
ambiguous words "conclusively presumed," the accompanying general instructions would
have sufficiently cured the possibility that the jury might have interpreted the challenged
instruction in an impermissable manner. Id. at 170-71, 440 A.2d at 862-63. Because the
challenged instruction in Johnson included the less ambiguous word "conclusive," how-
ever, the court concluded that the additional general instructions had not cured the chal-
lenged instruction. The court then considered whether the instructions relating to each
specific count might have cured the conclusive presumption instruction. Id. at 171-72, 440
A.2d at 863.
53. Regarding Johnson's intent to commit kidnapping, the trial court instructed the
jury that a man's intention is primarily a matter of inference:
Again, no witness can be expected to come here and testify that he looked into
another man's mind and saw therein a certain intention. The only way in
Connecticut v. Johnson
effect, the court reasoned that there was no Sandstrom error as
to the kidnapping count, and affirmed Johnson's conviction.54
Turning to the murder and robbery counts, however, the court
found that there were no additional qualifying instructions which
might have cured the conclusive or burden-shifting presump-
tion.55 The court concluded that the challenged instruction was
erroneous under Sandstrom with respect to both counts, and re-
versed both convictions.56 Finally, the court affirmed the convic-
tion for sexual assault, noting that because the crime did not
require specific intent, the challenged instruction would not have
affected the jury's verdict on that count.5 7
In reversing the murder and robbery convictions, the Connec-
ticut Supreme Court did not address the state's argument that
the Sandstrom error was harmless, apparently relying on an ear-
lier decision in which it had held that Sandstrom error could
never be harmless.58 The State of Connecticut subsequently ap-
pealed the court's reversal of the murder and robbery convictions
to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the trial
court's error was harmless.
The United States Supreme Court
The Plurality Opinion
In a plurality decision written by Justice Blackmun and joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White, the Court affirmed
the Connecticut Supreme Court's reversal of the murder and
which you can determine in a case such as this what a man's intention was at
any given time is by determining what his conduct was and what the circum-
stances were surrounding that conduct and from those infer what his intention
was. As stated before, to draw such an inference is not only the privilege but
also the duty of a juror, provided, of course, the inference to draw is a reason-
able inference.
Id. at 173, 440 A.2d at 864.
54. Id. at 174, 440 A.2d at 864.
55. In its specific instructions regarding the robbery count, the trial court explained
that intent was an element of the crime but had no further explanation regarding how it
was to be ascertained. Id. In its specific instructions regarding the murder count, the trial
court repeated the prohibited "conclusive presumption" language when referring to
intent. Id. at 172, 440 A.2d at 863.
56. Id. at 173-76, 440 A.2d at 863-65.
57. Id. at 176, 440 A.2d at 865.
58. In State v. Truppi, 182 Conn. 449, 438 A.2d 712 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941
(1981), the court held that a Sandstrom error could never be harmless. The case held that
because a Sandstrom error would allow the jury to find intent without considering the
1984]
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robbery convictions. 59 Noting that the State of Connecticut did
not appeal the Connecticut Supreme Court's determination of
Sandstrom error, the Court proceeded only to the narrower ques-
tion of whether a Sandstrom error could ever be harmless.60 The
plurality found that a conclusive presumption would, except in
rare instances, deprive the accused of "constitutional rights so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error."61
Because a conclusive presumption eases the jury's task, "there
is no reason to believe the jury would have deliberately under-
taken the more difficult tasks of evaluating the evidence on
intent."62 The plurality reasoned that the erroneous instruction
permitted the jury to find intent to kill as a matter of law, with-
out looking to the evidence of intent, once it had determined that
Johnson had committed the acts in question, and that the natu-
ral consequences of those acts would be to cause the victim's
death.63 The jury would therefore not need to consider evidence
tending to cast doubt on the intent element of the crime.64
Where the jury may have failed to consider evidence of intent,
the plurality stated, a reviewing court is precluded from holding
that the erroneous instruction did not contribute to the ver-
dict.65 The plurality found that it would be impossible for a
reviewing court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
evidence, a reviewing court could not examine the error for harmlessness no matter how
overwhelming the evidence without transferring to the court the jury's function of eval-
uating the evidence. Id. at 466, 438 A.2d at 721.
59. 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983). Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Jus-
tices Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion,
concurring in the judgment reached by the plurality opinion, but without reaching the
merits.
60. Id. at 975 n.10. Justice Stevens noted that Chapman does not require, but merely
permits, state appellate courts to make a harmless error determination in appropriate
cases. Id. at 978. Consequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court's refusal to make a harm-
less error determination did not present a federal question. Accordingly, Justice Stevens
voted to affirm that court's judgment. Id. at 979.
Both the plurality and the dissent, however, interpreted the Connecticut Supreme
Court's refusal to address the harmlessness contention as a reliance by that court on one
of its previous decisions in which it interpreted the federal harmless error rule to require
automatic reversal for Sandstrom error. Id. at 974-81. Accordingly, the plurality and dis-
sent noted, a federal question was presented. Id.
61. Id. at 978 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
62. Id. at 976-77 (quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 n.13 (1979)).
63. Id. at 976.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 977.
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jury had interpreted the instruction in a manner which would
lead them to review evidence of intent without considering the
applicability of the presumptive instruction. To allow a review-
ing court to speculate as to how the jury had evaluated the evi-
dence of intent would, in effect, remove the question of fact from
the jury and transfer it to the reviewing court.66 Thus, the plural-
ity concluded, the conclusive presumption instruction deprived
Johnson of constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that the
infraction could not be treated as harmless error.67
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that a conclusive presumption instruction
does not direct a verdict on the issue of intent. Such an instruc-
tion does not necessarily cause the jury to ignore the evidence on
intent and thus does not remove the issue from the jury's con-
sideration.68 Rather, a conclusive presumption merely provides
an alternative means by which the jury can find intent, to be
resorted to only if the evidence on that issue is unpersuasive. 69
Because a conclusive presumption does not prevent the jury from
reviewing the evidence of intent, a reviewing court is not pre-
cluded from determining that the evidence on intent was so
overwhelming that the jury did not need to rely on the pre-
sumption.7 0
The dissent utilized two premises in reaching its conclusion.
First, during the trial court's instructions to the jury in a crimi-
nal trial, additional instructions which explain general princi-
ples applicable to criminal law will normally be given. The addi-
tional instructions usually indicate that the state has the burden
of proving all elements of the offense, including intent, beyond a
reasonable doubt. These additional instructions also inform the
jury that intent is a question of fact to be determined solely by it.
In light of these additional instructions, the dissent argued that
a jury would not perceive the conclusive presumption instruction
as a directed verdict. Rather, the jury would perceive the conclu-
sive presumption instruction as merely one means by which it
might conclude that the state had met its burden of proving
66. Id. at 977 n.15.
67. Id. at 978 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.).
68. Id. at 982 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 982-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 983 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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intent, to be resorted to only if the evidence itself did not estab-
lish intent beyond a reasonable doubt.71
The second premise relied on by the dissent was that where
the defendant's acts are in and of themselves dispositive of
intent, a reviewing court may conclude that the weight of the
evidence enabled the jury to find intent without resorting to the
conclusive presumption instruction.72 In an execution-style slay-
ing, for example, where the defendant has bound his victim and
shot him repeatedly in the head, it would be clear beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that a jury would not need to rely on the conclu-
sive presumption instruction. 73 The impact of the presumption
on the jury's verdict will, of course, vary with the facts and
circumstances of each case. 74
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the dissent con-
cluded that a reviewing court might have been able to say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury had found the presump-
tion unnecessary to its determination of Johnson's intent. The
case should therefore have been remanded for that deter-
mination.75
71. Id. at 982-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 983 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 984 (Powell, J., dissenting). In a footnote, the dissent pointed to other cases
where it would have been clear that the jury would not have needed to rely on the pre-
sumption in order to determine that the requisite intent to kill existed. See, e.g., White v.
State, 415 So. 2d. 719 (Fla.) (members of motorcycle gang stabbed woman 14 times and
slit her throat twice), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d. 172
(Fla.) (defendant beat victim with a blunt instrument, wrapped a wire around his neck,
stuffed a towel into his mouth, and shot him twice in the head), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2973 (1982); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d. 1 (Mo.) (defendant strangled rape victim until his
companion, who was monitoring her pulse, told him it had ceased), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
933 (1981).
74. 103 S. Ct. at 984 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 985. (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that:
[O]n these facts, a reviewing court might well say beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury found the presumption unnecessary to its task of determining
intent. With respect to the charge of robb ery, the uncontradicted evidence was
that the respondent stated, "We need a car, we are going to take your car .... "
His actions confirmed his unequivocal statements: he overpowered the woman,
took her car, and never returned it. One would think that intent to rob could not
have been clearer. The evidence of respondent's intent on the attempted murder
charge could be viewed as only marginally less compelling. Having partici-
pated in a gang-type rape of this woman, respondent bound her hands with
wire and threw her into an icy river in the middle of December.
The jury, consistent with its instructions, could have regarded these facts as
dispositive of intent and not relied on the presumption.
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The dissent also criticized the plurality's approach as substan-
tially limiting Chapman's harmless error doctrine. The dissent
pointed out that in every harmless error case the possibility
exists that the error contributed to the jury's verdict.7 6 The
Chapman decision, however, rejected the argument that all fed-
eral constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circum-
stances, must always be deemed harmful. "Accordingly, the
proper inquiry is whether a court may say 'beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the ver-
dict obtained'."77 The dissent concluded that a court must assess
the effect of the error in light of the facts of each case, because "it
is only by assessing the weight of the evidence against the
defendant that the effect of the error on the jury's verdict can be
judged." 78
ANALYSIS
Both the plurality and the dissent noted that the question of
whether the trial court's additional instructions may have cured
the erroneous instructions was not before the court.7 9 Both
apparently assumed that there was error, and proceeded to the
question of whether or not the error was sufficiently harmless to
avoid reversal. Prior Supreme Court harmless error decisions
dating back to Chapman had consistently addressed this ques-
tion by examining all of the evidence to determine whether the
error might reasonably have contributed to the jury's verdict.80
Despite this fact, the appropriateness of weighing a Sandstrom
error against the evidence of intent became the point of conten-
tion between the plurality and dissent.
Of the differing conclusions reached by the plurality and the
dissent, the plurality's conclusion is clearly the correct one.
While the dissent's analysis provides an adequate basis upon
which a reviewing court can conclude that a jury did not need to
rely upon a particular presumption, it provides no basis upon
which a reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury did indeed interpret the presumption as merely an
76. Id. at 983 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 981-82 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967)).
78. Id. at 982 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. See supra text accompanying note 60.
80. See supra note 8.
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alternative rather than a directed verdict. It would appear that
such an analysis is foreclosed by the apparent fact that a Sand-
strom error, by definition, is a determination that there was a
reasonable doubt that the jury interpreted the presumption as a
directed verdict, or, at the very least, as a shift in the burden of
persuasion.
In Sandstrom, the Court had held that the question of whether
a presumptive intent jury instruction denies a defendant his con-
stitutional rights depends upon the manner in which a reason-
able juror could have interpreted the instruction.81 The critical
fact that appears to follow from the Sandstrom analysis is that
by finding that a Sandstrom error has occurred, a court has
already concluded that there is at least a reasonable doubt that
the jury interpreted the instruction as either a directed verdict or
as a shift in the burden of persuasion. Thus, a Sandstrom error,
by definition, precludes a reviewing court from ever concluding
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury interpreted the instruc-
tion only as an alternative. What the Sandstrom Court seem-
ingly did was formulate an analysis which examines a presump-
tive intent instruction for harmlessness before it concludes that
the instruction constituted error.
In determining that the instruction given in Sandstrom consti-
tuted error, the Court noted that there was a lack of any qualify-
ing instructions as to the legal effect of the presumption. The
Court also noted that the resulting potential for impermissible
interpretations of the presumption was not removed by the other
instructions given at the trial. The implication therefore arises
that a presumptive intent instruction could conceivably be cured
or rendered harmless by certain additional or qualifying instruc-
tions. The Connecticut Supreme Court took precisely this ap-
proach in its determination that while the conclusive presump-
tion instruction had not been cured with respect to the murder
and robbery counts, it had been cured with respect to the kid-
napping count.8 2
This approach, which focuses on the additional or qualifying
instructions in determining whether or not the instruction was
81. 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54. Other courts have also taken such an
approach, although not reaching the same conclusion as to whether the additional
instructions were sufficient to cure or render harmless the presumptive intent instruction.
In Jacks v. Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1981), the defendant had been convicted of
[Vol. 15388
harmless, is sound for two reasons. First, the approach focuses
on the trial court's instructions, rather than the evidence on
intent, as the factor which renders harmless an erroneous
instruction of law. A presumptive intent instruction differs from
other types of errors to which the harmless error doctrine has
been applied in that it is an incorrect statement of law rather
than an item of improperly admitted evidence. It follows that
only other instructions on law, rather than evidence, will affect
first-degree murder. During that trial, the trial court instructed the jury, in part, that:
[E]very man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts, and
when one does an illegal act, he is responsible for all the consequences that
legitimately flow therefrom.
You are instructed that where specific intent is required to make an act an
offense .. it is not always possible to prove a purpose by direct evidence, for
purpose and intent arq subjective facts. That is, they exist within the mind of
man, and since you cannot delve into a person's mind and determine his pur-
pose and intent, you may look to all the surrounding circumstances, including
what was said and done in relation thereto; bearing in mind the presumption of
law, that every one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequen-
ces of his voluntary acts, unless the circumstances are such as to indicate the
absence of such intent.
When an unlawful act, however, is proved to be knowingly done, no further
proof is needed on the part of the state in the absence of justifying or excusing
facts, since the law presumes a criminal intent from an unlawful act knowingly
done.
Id. at 490-91.
The defendant Jacks appealed his conviction on the grounds that the above jury
instructions violated his constitutional rights under Sandstrom because the instructions
allowed the jury to presume intent against him. The court held that the presumptive
intent instructions contained within the group of instructions had beeen cured by the
additional and qualifying instructions, and thus did not constitute error. Id. at 485-87. In
concluding that the instruction had been cured, the court emphasized the fact that the
jury had been instructed to look at all the surrounding circumstances, consider any justi-
fying or excusing facts, and consider any circumstances that might have indicated the
absence of intent. Id. at 485.
In Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1981), the defendant had been convicted on a
charge of burglary. The defendant Dietz appealed his conviction on the grounds that the
presumptive intent instruction rendered by the court had the effect of shifting the burden
of proof on the issue of intent to the defendant. Although both the presumptive intent
instruction and the additional and qualifying instructions given in Dietz were very sim-
ilar to those given in Jacks, the court concluded that the presumptive intent instruction
had not been cured by the additional instructions, and thus constituted error. Id. at 131.
The court noted that while the effect of the erroneous instruction was to be determined in
light of the accompanying instructions, it is, as a general rule, unlikely that accompany-
ing instructions will be able to cure a presumptive intent instruction. Id. at 130-31. The
court concluded that because the instruction constitutued error, and because intent was
an issue in the case, the conviction had to be reversed. Id. at 131.
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the manner in which a jury will likely interpret the erroneous
instruction. 83
Second, this approach produces either a conclusion that there
was no error, because there was no reasonable doubt that the
jury could have interpreted the instruction in an impermissible
manner, or a conclusion that there was non-harmless error,
because a reasonable doubt existed that the jury interpreted the
instruction in an impermissible manner. Either conclusion would
avoid the seemingly anomalous result of "harmless error."
The Sandstrom analysis appears to incorporate a check for
harmlessness within itself, evaluating additional or qualifying
instructions to determine whether a jury could reasonably have
interpreted the erroneous instruction in an impermissible
manner. It follows that once a court determines that a Sand-
strom error has occurred, the conviction must be reversed, because
the court has already determined that the error was not harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.
JOHNSON'S IMPACT
While the plurality's analysis ultimately reached the correct
conclusion that a Sandstrom error can never be harmless, it
failed in two important respects to provide courts with clear
guidelines for future decisions. First, the plurality's analysis fails
to emphasize that a conclusion that a Sandstrom error requires
automatic reversal is not inconsistent with the Chapman Court's
rejection of an automatic reversal rule for all federal constitu-
tional errors. Insofar as the Sandstrom analysis incorporates a
check for harmlessness before it concludes with a finding of
error, automatic reversals of Sandstrom error are entirely con-
sistent with the principles established in Chapman.
Second, the plurality's analysis fails to discuss the process by
which a presumptive intent jury instruction can be analyzed for
harmlessness. The Sandstrom Court's analysis dictates that the
additional or qualifying instructions, rather than the evidence on
intent, are the proper factors to be considered when analyzing a
presumptive intent instruction for harmlessness.
These deficiencies in the plurality's analysis are significant in
that they may lead future courts to conclude incorrectly either
83. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) wherein the Court stated that it is a
"well-established proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in
artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Id. at 147-48.
[Vol. 15
Connecticut v. Johnson
that presumptive intent jury instructions are not to be analyzed
for harmlessness,8 4 or that evidence of intent is the proper factor
to be considered when analyzing a presumptive intent
instruction for harmlessness.8 5
CONCLUSION
A Sandstrom error requires automatic reversal, because a
Sandstrom analysis has already considered the question of
whether the instruction was harmless and has determined that it
was not before it ever concludes that a Sandstrom error occurred.
Insofar as the State of Connecticut did not appeal the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court's determination of Sandstrom error with
respect to the murder and robbery counts, the Connecticut
Supreme Court's judgment that the convictions required auto-
matic reversal was correctly affirmed. Because the Johnson
Court failed to recognize, however, that the Sandstrom analysis
does examine a presumptive intent instruction for harmlessness
before it determines that the instruction constituted error, the
Court failed to realize that such an instruction can be analyzed
for harmlessness. Future courts should thus look to the Connec-
ticut Supreme Court's opinion for a better illustration of how a
Sandstrom analysis is employed in evaluating a presumptive
intent instruction for harmlessness.
CHARLES A. DORFF, JR.
84. See Hammontree v. Phelps, 0uo F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1979) (giving of presump-
tive intent instruction cannot be harmless because of possibility that instruction might
contribute to jury's verdict).
85. Of course, the plurality did not advocate reviewing the evidence to determifie the
effect of a Sandstrom error. In fact, the plurality expressly rejected such a notion. The
plurality's failure to reconcile its opinion with Chapman and its progeny, however, may
lead future courts to reject the plurality's conclusion and to continue to resort to the tradi-
tional "evidence as a whole" approach espoused by the dissent. See Healy v. Maggio, 706
F.2d 698, 702 (5th Cir. 1983) (post-Johnson decision holding that presumptive intent
instruction which constituted error was harmless where the "evidence was so dispositive
of intent that.., the jury would not have found it necessary to rely on the presumption");
Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1982) (presumptive intent instruction
did constitute error but was harmless where evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that
no reasonable juror could have determined that defendant acted without intent).
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